[Warning: The following “blog entry” (!) turned out to be almost 6000 words. I guess I'm going to have to convert it into an actual journal article ... ]
Christ and the Rich Young Ruler, by Heinrich Hofmann, 1889
~ 1 ~
In a blog
post responding to recent
reviews of David Bentley Hart's That All Shall be Saved, Fr Aidan Kimel
writes:
“The infernalist needs to
demonstrate, not just assume, that it is possible for a human being to
extinguish within himself all desire for the Good.” [Quotation 1]
He also writes:
“Even when we reject God, we are
seeking God. An unquenchable desire for deifying union with our Creator
constitutes who we are as human beings. For this reason, no person, no matter
how wicked and vicious, can definitively close himself to the gracious
influence of his Creator. His desire for the Good is ineradicable.” [Quotation
2]
I respond to these claims below.
It is not my intention to evaluate or respond to the entire post from which these
quotation were taken—let alone to review or evaluate Hart’s book as a whole. First
some groundwork. An infernalist is someone who believes that
(1) all created spirits exist
forever (no person is annihilated),
(2) hell exists,
(3) some human persons/souls go to
hell after their time on earth has ended, and
(4) God has decreed that whoever
goes to hell (after their particular judgement*) shall remain there forever in
conscious torment.
*For human persons, the
particular judgement follows immediately after one’s time on earth has ended.
There are a number of testimonies of people who claim that they died and found
themselves in a place that they describe as being hell, but who were revived
either through natural means or miraculously. Some even report that they were
shown what would have been their place in hell if God did not give them another
chance in a revived life. I am firmly of the belief that at least some of these
people are faithfully reporting a real experience and that the latter is
spiritually “objective”—that it was not merely an hallucination caused by, say,
a temporary lack of oxygen in the brain, and that their interpretation of the
experience is largely correct (they were in hell, not purgatory). Suppose I am
right on this. Suppose that that some people have indeed come back to life
after finding themselves in hell after (temporary) death. Because God knew that
these souls would be given another chance at life, they were not subject to their
particular judgement this time around, properly speaking. They were merely “visiting”
hell, if you will. To “go to hell”, as I am defining it, is to enter hell after
one has been judged by God (the particular judgement). To visit hell is not yet
to “go to hell” in the sense I am using here—though I assume it is possible for
a human person to visit hell and then actually go to hell after an unrepentant
(second chance at) life.
From (4) it follows that
(5) Whoever goes to hell remains there
forever in conscious torment.
For whatever God decrees,
necessarily comes to pass (this follows from my definition of a divine decree).
Thus (4) rules out the possibility of conversion or purification as a way of
getting out of hell and into heaven; it also rules out annihilation. One might
attempt to make sense of (4) by saying that
(6) The damned are effectively
trapped in hell on account of some special positive action of God—apart from this
restraining action, such souls would be able to find their way out (through a
change of heart, for example).
But a more satisfactory
explanation is to say
(7) The only metaphysically
possible way for a soul to get out of hell, given the soul’s condition upon its
entrance into hell, would be through a special divine intervention.
Keeping to (4) and (7), one might
say that God ensures that the damned stay in hell, not by actively keeping them
there by some positively restraining action, but by never intervening so as to
retrieve them or provide them with a lifeline. On this view, the damned in hell
are left forever to their own devices—devices which are forever impotent for
their salvation (God continues to sustain them in being, however).
A universalist believes
that hell exists but denies that hell is forever for any person—human or
angelic—who goes to hell. Every spiritual entity that goes to hell passes through
hell (perhaps after aeons upon aeons), eventually to end up in heaven.
Universalists agree with
(1) all created spirits exist
forever,
(2) hell exists, and
(3) some human persons/souls go
to hell after their time on earth has ended.
But they reject
(5) whoever goes to hell remains
there forever in conscious torment
and therefore also
(4) God has decreed that whoever
goes to hell shall remain there forever in conscious torment.
In place of (4) the universalist
says: God has decreed that anyone (human or angel) who goes to hell shall not
remain there forever in conscious torment—they shall pass through the purifying
fires of hell on the way to heaven.
~ 2 ~
Now to return to the first claim
in question:
“The infernalist needs to
demonstrate, not just assume, that it is possible for a human being to
extinguish within himself all desire for the Good.”
Fr Kimel agrees with David
Bentley Hart that
(8) The human person is fundamentally
oriented toward the Good (which is God)
And that
(9) The human person requires the
beatific vision in order to be perfectly happy.
This, in fact, is the view of
Thomas Aquinas. However, universalists reject Aquinas’s claim that
(10) It is possible for a created
person (angelic or human) to set himself in opposition to God forever, and to
do this voluntarily.
(This claim is common in the Latin
West and is not unique to Aquinas). I accept (10) and understand it to mean
that there are created persons who, while not being predestined to hell in the
Calvinist sense, are able to reject God freely and definitively. Hell is a
genuinely possible destination for them, since God has not infallibly
predestined them to heaven (though he gives them sufficient grace to be saved),
and their circumstances in life will give them sufficient opportunity to accept
or reject God.
In my view not every human person
is in this category—I believe that some are never given the opportunity to
reject God definitively, which defiance is the only way they could have deserved
hell (think of severely mentally disabled persons and children who die early).
However, I think the possibility described in (10) applies to the vast majority
of human persons, and this is enough for (10) to be true.
Universalists are baffled as to
how a person who is radically and dynamically ordered toward God (point 8),
could possibly oppose God voluntarily and do this forever (point 10). There’s a
lot that one could say on this point. In this post I simply indicate a way
forward in the discussion. I begin with a question:
Is it possible for a human
person, in this life, to take a definitive stance on something? Is it possible
for someone to commit her whole self to something or to someone, in a
once-and-for-all act of will?
It would seem so. Otherwise what could
it mean to take a vow, to make a solemn promise, or to give one’s word? Surely,
if a person is sufficiently mature psychologically, he is able to take a
stance, to make a statement that is meant to apply not just for the
present moment, but for the rest of his life.
When in the marriage ceremony a
man promises to be faithful to his wife until death, we take him at his word. To
be sure, there are many cases in which it would be reasonable to be dubious
about a man’s sincerity or his ability to keep such a noble promise. But that
is beside the point. The point is that the ability to enact a solemn commitment
is within the realm of human possibility, at least where humanity is shaped by
culture and affected by grace.
Suppose, however, that the above
is not within the realm of human possibility. That would mean, for
example, that a man cannot transcend the present moment and promise sincerely
and realistically to be faithful to his wife (and future children). The best a
man could do is say, “I don’t know how things will be in the future. I have no
idea what my feelings will be, or where I’ll stand in relation to you as time
goes on. My beliefs might change, or my love might pass away. I’m not going to
promise something that I can’t promise. After all, the future me is in the
future; I have no control over that non-existent person right now. The best I
can do is will stay with you now, through this night, while my desire and
attraction for you lasts. We will have to play it by ear. Every day, indeed
every moment, I will have to keep you updated.”
Indeed, such a man could not even
promise to keep his partner updated! (I say “partner”, because it is inaccurate
to say that this woman would truly be his “wife”). If he can’t be reasonably sure
about his future self, then neither can he be reasonably sure about his ability
and willingness (in the future) to be decent enough to inform his partner that
he is leaving.
In truth, however, it is
possible under certain conditions to take our life as a whole, to
encompass all of the moments (or future moments) in our lives from a
transcendent standpoint, and to give ourselves over more or less
unconditionally to a person, or to a cause, or to an idea. A husband, for
example, does not merely give one moment to his wife, and then the next,
and then the next, keeping her perpetually updated about the status of his love
in each moment. Rather, a husband qua husband has committed his whole
self though future time to his wife (“till death do us part”). (The
self-donation is not so radical that the husband literally worships his wife—only
God deserves that—but the point remains).
To be faithful to a promise or
vow is something quite different to merely shaping a series of moments in one’s
life, one after the other, as if the series of moments were merely accidentally
connected. In this scenario it just so happens that the man adopts the same positive
attitude to his wife in each moment. Or perhaps there is a natural continuity
of attitude, but this continuity has not been appropriated, elevated and announced
in a solemn vow. In any case the series of moments is not gathered together intentionally
as one whole life (into the future) given over in advance.
After a promise is made, to give
oneself in each moment, as time passes, is to confirm and fulfill the promise
made in the beginning. The solemn vow transcends the moments; it stands above the
moments (and the ones who made the vow) as a subsisting, holy thing which calls
for its perpetual fulfilment. The vow stands to the moments as the soul stands
to the body. (Everything I’ve said about the marriage vow above can be applied
to the solemn vow of a religious person, mutatis mutandis).
Dietrich von Hildebrand speaks
about the “super-actuality” of love. In the details of life, through the
various circumstances, as spouses confirm their ongoing love for each other in
different ways, love is “actualised” again and again—it is expressed anew in
the moment. However, this actuality does not arise from mere potential understood
as a privation—from a lack of actuality—for their love is a superabundant
source of actuality, a wellspring that continually brims to the surface in time
(assuming they are faithful to their promise and stay close to the divine
source of love). There is an all-embracing fullness and total intentionality in
their love that transcends moments in time and gathers them together in
advance, even as the spouses are blind, more or less, to what they will have to
face in the future (e.g., the unanticipated chaos of raising children!).
(Von
Hildbrand doesn’t claim that love is only super-actual once a promise or vow
has been made. All forms of love, and indeed all modes of response to value, can
be super-actual, even without there being some sort of promise or commitment.
He also indicates in his Ethics that sinful attitudes are super-actual.)
~ 3 ~
The universalist might reply as
follows: Very well. Even in this life, people can and often do commit
themselves to something or someone with a super-actual attitude of
approval or consent. They freely “mark” themselves as being totally for such-and-such,
where this being-for transcends in advance the various moments in which
it is to be lived out. But from that it does not follow that
(11) Human persons can enact a
super-actual attitude that amounts to a total rejection of God.
Assuming such a rejection of God
is possible, it would involve a type of commitment that could not be reduced to
an instantaneous attitude or stance, or even to a homogenous series of such
attitudes or stances. However (argues the universalist), the total rejection in
question would go directly against the ontological grain of the person (see
point 8 above). And such a thing is impossible.
My response as follows. I agree
that the total rejection in question would go against the ontological grain of
the person rejecting God. But from this it does not follow that (11) is false. In
my view, (11) is true, as is the following claim (which adds more detail):
(12) It is psychologically
possible for a person to commit himself totally and super-actually to something
other than God (some idol or collection of idols) in such a way as to oppose
the charity of God totally and super-actually.
Let this be called the Mortal Sin
Thesis or MST. Here “psychologically” is used in the Scholastic sense,
referring to the spiritual faculties of the human person. Hence “moral
psychology.”
A universalist might object to my
use of “totally” in MST (point 12) as follows. In respect to some object or end
X, if a person cannot commit himself to X totally and in such a way that
his commitment is deeply and objectively good for him—if the person’s
total commitment to X would not accord with his fundamental nature (including
his natural will) as a person—then it is impossible for him to commit himself
to X totally, after all. For his basic nature and orientation will never
“go along” with the commitment. The act may still be possible, but the person
acting thus will do violence to himself (while second nature is mutable,
altering one’s basic nature is out of the question); it will be an
act—and then a super-actual stance—of self-contradiction, a certain
“contortion” of oneself. But the person is fundamentally oriented toward God
(point 8). Therefore it is impossible for a person to commit himself totally
to anything other than God.
I agree that there is a sense in
which God is the only object to which we can give ourselves “totally”—if “totally”
means “self-consistently”, in accordance with one’s natural orientation. To sin,
to reject God, is to do violence against oneself and frustrate one’s deepest
longings. But that does not make MST false. My point in MST is that the person
is a “totality” or “whole” that is structurally able to give itself as a
whole. A person is able to give a definitive YES or NO to something, where this
stance and “word” of the whole self then becomes super-actual. This “word” of
the self might align with one’s deepest nature or it might contradict it—but
that is another matter.
Granted, in giving oneself to an
idol, there is not the “true freedom” of abiding in the truth and living as a
child of God. But from that it does not follow that nobody is personally
responsible when they commit an act of idolatry (or any sin). I am not “truly
free” when I sin, because radical attachment to anything other than God is spiritual
slavery. Nonetheless, I can still be responsible, with libertarian freedom (free
will as the concurrent ability to will X or not will X) for my sin. Sin
contradicts the objective moral order, and one’s God-given structure as a human
person—but that does not mean that the sinner qua sinner loses libertarian
freedom, personal responsibility. A sinner is still in possession of himself; on
the day of judgement he will be unable to plead insanity. In every morally
significant act, and therefore in every sin, there is an “enactment of self”.
The sinner gives himself over to some loved object; he is able to do so
because he is in possession of himself (to repeat: he has not lost his mind in
such a way that in his defence he could plead insanity). So yes: sin is slavery
and violence to self, and “true freedom” can only be found in loving obedience
to God. Indeed, Augustine is right to say that the most perfect freedom is the
freedom of the saints in heaven, who are unable to sin. But none of that
contradicts the fact that sinners on earth are responsible for their sin
in that (1) they are in possession of themselves as persons (while
self-possession can be lost in moments of insanity or while one’s brain isn’t
functioning as it should, it is false to say that a sinner qua sinner
loses possession of himself), (2) they are therefore able as intelligent beings
to give themselves over to an object that is taken to be good and (3) they are not,
as a rule, determined by circumstances to will as they do in the moment.
The following should also be
noted. It is possible to commit oneself in an attitude and course of action
that is mortally sinful, and for that super-actual attitude to abide in the
soul as unrepented mortal sin, without that meaning that every single aspect
and moment of one’s life is consistent with that attitude. In order to be in
mortal sin, it is not necessary to have “narrowed” or “simplified” one’s life,
with a certain perverse “perfection”, into the single-minded pursuit of sin. It
is one thing to consent fully—to deliver oneself over—to a sinful attitude in the
act of (mortal) sin. It is another for this consenting “word” of sin to become
incarnate in every detail of one’s life. This is an inverted mirror image of
how it is with our salvation. It is one thing to consent fully—to deliver
oneself over—to Jesus in a sincere act of repentance and conversion. It is
another for this consenting “word” of repentance and conversion to become
incarnate in every detail of one’s life.
Finally, does “total” rejection
of God (in MST) mean that God is hated under every aspect? That would
mean that God is seen by the person under every aspect—under every divine perfection,
and under every relation to creatures (e.g., as Creator and as Lord)—and hated
by that person under each of those aspects. Or does it mean that God is hated
under every known aspect? That would mean that the person in question hates
God under all the aspects under which he knows God. In both cases the answer is
no. The “totality” referred to here is the totality of the person who rejects
God. In mortal sin a person withdraws himself-as-a-whole away from the
love of God, in the act of delivering himself-as-a-whole over to some
illicitly desired object.
~ 4 ~
That should do to clarify the
meaning of MST. Now to defend it. Suppose MST is false. In that case there is
no such thing as a mortal sin; all sins are venial. One cannot become radically
opposed to God (in second nature or gnomic will). But then why do some people
go to hell, even if only temporarily (as per universalism), so as to be
purified by fire? On this view, hell is reduced to a lower stage of purgatory. And
because mortal sin is impossible, the “sin and darkness” from which Christ
saves turns out to be far less serious as a spiritual condition, and far less
offensive to God (here “far less” indicates a difference of type). Salvation
turns out to be little more than spiritual “fine-turning”—a number of adjustments
in a soul whose fundamental stance vis-Ã -vis God has never been incorrect.
The other problem with rejecting MST is that
it flies in the face of the moral facts. Many people—too many people—have engaged
in evil with a depth and intensity which is horrifying, and with an intentional
seriousness which is truly frightening. There is such a thing as a demonic
attitude. How else can we do justice to the phenomena without invoking the
language (if not the dogmatic theology) of the “demonic”? Consider the serial
rapist, the sadistic torturer, or one who hates a people so much as to commit
genocide? Surely, these people have given themselves over to evil with a
certain “totality” and “definitiveness”. If these monsters were to turn back to
the light, this would involve something far more radical than their being
cleansed of a few venial faults, or their being corrected for a few unfortunate
mistakes! They have turned themselves completely inside-out, as it were; they need
to be radically converted so that they are spiritually open to the Good
again. In their state they are not simply “imperfect”. No—they are spiritually
ruined. The appropriate instinctive response to their spiritual state is
horror and repulsion (which is not to say that one can’t show spiritual mercy to
a ruined soul).
I am not claiming that as
long as a person does not descend to such “diabolical” depths of sin, he has
not rejected God and is safe from hell. Nor am I claiming that a person is not
spiritually ruined until he participates in diabolical sin. My reason for
focussing on the diabolical was to make the following point. Clearly, a theologian who rejects MST cannot
do justice to the phenomena: the diabolical, the monstrosity of certain
expressions of evil. The truth is, sometimes people utter a “word” in their
speech and in their actions which is not merely imperfect, but is radically
opposed to the Word of God. How else can we justly evaluate the speeches of
a Hitler, or the mass violence committed by a communist dictator? These
anti-words are uttered with full commitment. Those who speak these anti-words are
completely serious. These people mean what they say and do. They are “insane”
in the sense that their thoughts and actions are quite at odds with divine
wisdom and natural law. They are “insane” in the sense that they are hell-bent
on a state of mind and course of action that is self-destructive and whose
intended outcome is impossible (for there is no rest for the wicked, and evil
cannot prevail against the will of God). But from this is does not follow they
are not responsible for their wicked attitudes and deeds in the way that
a legally insane person is not responsible (assuming the legal judgement is correct).
In summary, if MST is false, then
no person—not even a demon—could utter a radically negative, anti-Christian
word in speech and/or action. Nobody could speak an anti-Christian word and
really mean it; nobody could not put themselves into their anti-Christian
word, in full commitment. But such evil does occur. People become what
they channel, what they say and do, what they devote themselves to. People can be
overtaken by and committed to an anti-word. Therefore MST is true.
~ 5 ~
Where does that leave the
universalist? One option is to say
(13) For one who is bathed in
the loving presence of God—God effectively showing and giving himself as
the infinite Good—it is psychologically impossible to commit oneself (in that
situation) totally and super-actually to something other than God in such a way
as to oppose the charity of God totally and super-actually.
Following this line of thought,
there is such a thing as diabolical evil, and this is far more repulsive
and offensive to God than falling into sin in a moment of weakness, or doing what
one “hates to do” (Rom 7:15). But the condition that makes diabolical evil
possible is the withdrawal of the loving presence of God. If God were to show
himself to a person as the Good (infinite love) with sufficient intensity and
clarity, such a person could not, under those conditions, continue to oppose the
charity of God. The super-actual attitude of diabolical evil would lose its
grip; the person would necessarily begin to turn back to the light.
Here the universalist might say
that the superabundant presence of God’s love—the presence which, it is
claimed, makes continued opposition to God impossible—amounts to parousia
and (on the side of the person) the beatific vision. However, it is not
necessary to go that far, and the equation of being “bathed in the loving
presence of God” with parousia is not essential to (13).
As I see it, there is nothing to
stop an infernalist from agreeing to (13). All that an infernalist has to say
is
(14) God allows some people to
die in a state of radical opposition to God, and to face him in that state for
their particular judgement, where this judgement determines their final
destination (heaven or hell).
This does not contradict the claim
that everyone has sufficient grace and a generously fair opportunity to turn to
God and be saved. It does not imply the Calvinist doctrine of the “rebrobate” (that
because of an infallible decree of God, those who go to hell could not possibly
have avoided going to hell). But given (13), it does imply that
(15) God allows some people to
die and face him for their particular judgment without being bathed in so
much divine love that, if previously they opposed him, they now convert (or
begin to convert) to him necessarily.
In other words, an infernalist
can agree that an extraordinary and abundant outpouring of God’s love on
a person just before death (or just after death) would necessitate even the
most hardened sinner’s conversion to God and infallibly effect their salvation—but
if an infernalist does agree, he must deny that God grants this
extraordinary grace to everyone who dies in radical opposition to God.
Regarding the angelic spirits, some
infernalists might agree (i) that an extraordinary and abundant outpouring of
God’s love on a fallen angel at some point (say, the end of time) would
necessitate even Satan’s conversion to God and infallibly effect his salvation—but
it they do agree, they will have to deny that God grants this
extraordinary grace to any fallen angel (for no infernalist thinks that the
fallen angels might be saved). Alternatively, he can agree (ii) that an
extraordinary and abundant outpouring of God’s love on the angels would have prevented
all of them from falling (a hypothetical scenario which, for the infernalist at
least, is far less problematic than the conversion of fallen angels)—but if he
does agree, he must deny that God granted this extraordinary grace to all
angels, given that some angels fell (which nobody denies).
Someone might object: but God has
poured out his love in an extraordinary and abundant way—first in the Old
Covenant, but most perfectly in Christ. Moreover, all the angels must have
known the abundant love of God, even before some of them fell. My response: I
grant that God’s displays of love are “extraordinary” and “abundant” in comparison
to finite love, in comparison to what we deserve, and in comparison to anything
we might have anticipated. However, even all of this did not suffice to
secure, infallibly, the salvation of every person (man and angel), even though
it secured, infallibly, the genuine possibility of salvation for every
person. This was not through some fault or omission of God, but is an
expression of his perfect wisdom and justice. In this discussion above, the
“extraordinary and abundant outpouring of God’s love” is something over and
above both (i) the abundant displays of God’s mercy in salvation history and (ii)
the continuous promptings or invitations of God throughout a person’s life,
both directly and indirectly (through circumstances and created means), which nonetheless
respect the free-will of the person.
At this point, the disagreement
between the universalist and the infernalist turns from questions about moral
psychology to questions about the economy of grace.
Does God grant an extraordinary
grace of conversion (as above) to everyone who dies (or who is about to die) in
radical opposition to God?* If not, how is that compatible with the infinite
love and mercy of God? If so, how is that compatible with the infinite holiness
and justice of God?
* A universalist might say that this
extraordinary grace of conversion is given before a soul goes to hell (thus preparing
it for the process of purification in hell), or alternatively, that it is given
at the end of the soul’s time in hell (thus ending the process of purification).
I can’t see how a universalist
could reasonably reject infernalism simply on the basis given above—i.e.,
that it is psychologically impossible (against MST) for a person to oppose the
charity of God, given that every person is radically oriented toward the Good.
For it is unreasonable to deny that diabolical expressions of evil are
possible. What is reasonable is the claim that diabolical expressions of
evil are only possible as long as the person in question is not flooded with an
extraordinary outpouring of grace—an outpouring that would necessitate his
conversion or infallibly prevent his fall into evil. And so the disagreement
(real or apparent) over moral psychology turns out to be a red herring. If
my judgement is correct, the real point of contention concerns the three
italicised questions above.
~ 6 ~
Let me return now to the two
quotations. Fr Kimel claims that “The infernalist needs to demonstrate, not
just assume, that it is possible for a human being to extinguish within himself
all desire for the Good” [Quotation 1]. My respectful response is as follows. In
order to give oneself over to diabolic evil and assume a super-actual state of
opposition to God (as explained above)—is it necessary to extinguish within
oneself all desire for the Good?
Suppose Fr Kimel says yes. In
that case either (a) it is impossible for anyone (human or demonic) to give
himself over to diabolic evil and oppose God super-actually or (b) such evil is
possible and it is possible to extinguish within oneself all desire for
the Good. Obviously Fr Kimel is not going to accept (b). I’m almost certain
that he wouldn’t accept (a) either. For he writes: “An unquenchable desire for
deifying union with our Creator constitutes who we are as human beings. For
this reason, no person, no matter how wicked and vicious, can
definitively close himself to the gracious influence of his Creator.”
[Quotation 2, my italics].
But if the answer is no, the
infernalist does not need to demonstrate “that is possible to extinguish
within himself all desire for the Good” after all! All he needs to demonstrate
is that it is possible to enter the next life in the super-actual state of
opposition to God, and to remain helplessly fixed in that state forever.
A universalist will then reply
that God, being infinite love, would not allow such a thing to occur—God
reveals his goodness to every dying (or dead) person with sufficient clarity
and intensity so that he is unable to remain fixed in his state of opposition.
The infernalist disagrees. In one
version of infernalism (the one I favour), it was God’s will that, for some created
persons (perhaps most), their entrance into heaven depends on their accepting
freely, with libertarian freedom, the gift of grace (i.e., amply sufficient
grace, but not necessitating grace). God wants to be glorified in souls who choose
him freely (in the libertarian sense)—which is to say, even in the absence of an
overwhelming revelation of God’s goodness. For the infernalist, there is no
contradiction between this order of things on the one hand, and the infinite
love of God on the other.
Fr Kimel writes [Quotation 2]: “Even
when we reject God, we are seeking God. [1] An unquenchable desire for deifying
union with our Creator constitutes who we are as human beings. For this reason,
[2] no person, no matter how wicked and vicious, can definitively close himself
to the gracious influence of his Creator. His desire for the Good is
ineradicable.”
I believe I have written enough
to show that the second claim does not follow from the first. In order
for the conclusion to follow, one of the following has to be added to the
argument:
(16) The person’s innate capacity
for God, or (in other words) his structural dynamism toward the Good, is
sufficient in itself to ensure that he does not fall into the state of mortal
sin.
(17) The person’s innate capacity
for God, or (in other words) his structural dynamism toward the Good, is
sufficient in itself to ensure that he does not remain in the state of mortal
sin indefinitely.
Premise (16) is obviously false.
There is such a thing as diabolical sin (a particularly clear example of mortal
sin), and Jesus wasn’t sent merely to save us from the superficial
imperfections of a soul whose factual orientation of will (super-actual stance)
remains righteous and true. No, the salvation spoken of in the Bible means a radical
correction; it effects a radical transformation of the person.
If (17) is true, there is a
certain self-saving “elasticity” about the soul. A soul that has fallen into
sin naturally and automatically “snaps back” into righteousness. But this is
obviously false to the facts—and it is hardly compatible with the Gospel!
Suppose Fr Kimel adds the
following instead as the premise of his argument:
(18) The person’s innate capacity
for God, or (in other words) his structural dynamism toward the Good, is
sufficient to ensure that he does not remain in the state of mortal sin indefinitely
in the face of an extraordinary and overwhelming revelation of God’s
goodness.
But in that case the conclusion is
not that “no person, no matter how wicked and vicious, can definitively close
himself to the gracious influence of his Creator”, as above. Rather, the
conclusion is that
(19) No person, no matter how
wicked and vicious, can definitively close himself to the gracious influence of
his Creator if this “gracious influence” is poured out in such an
overwhelming fashion as to make resistance to God psychologically impossible.
Such a conclusion is hardly
remarkable. In fact, it is trivial. It does nothing to refute infernalism. One
can be an infernalist and accept (19) unreservedly and consistently.
© Brendan Triffett, 2021.
Image from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hoffman-ChristAndTheRichYoungRuler.jpg
