This is a shorter (< 1000 words) and simpler version of the main argument contained in my previous post. I approach things from a slightly different angle here, however, and the wording is different.
The animals going in were male and female of every living thing, as God had commanded Noah. Then the LORD shut him in.
Gen 7:16 (NIV, my emphasis).
Painting by Jan van 't Hoff.
I begin with two theses:
(1) Our hearts are restless until they rest in God
[A truth made famous by Augustine in his Confessions. Cf. Points (8) and (9) in the previous post].
(2) God is able to put each created person into a situation that would non-violently necessitate her acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secure her salvation.
To say that God “is able” to put each created person into the situation described above is to say that for a created person to be in that situation and be necessitated non-violently to accept the love of God, does not involve any inherent contradiction. One can be “non-violently” necessitated to accept the love of God in the sense that under certain conditions, one cannot help but turn to God in love. It is understood that this turning to God in love is voluntary—it is willed whole-heartedly, with sufficiently clear knowledge that there is genuine consent—and perfective—for loving communion with God is the deepest desire of each person, and its realisation represents one’s final perfection. “Voluntary” does not imply libertarian free-will—i.e., the simultaneous ability to will X and not-X under the same conditions.
The first thesis supports the second. The reason that God is able to non-violently necessitate our love for Him is that we are made for Him—our essential will is oriented to the Good, which is God.
It is traditional Catholic teaching that, while the saints in heaven love God voluntarily, they are not free (with libertarian free-will) to turn away from God. To enjoy the beatific vision is to be in a situation that non-violently necessitates one’s total adherence to God. However, someone who accepts (2) is not thereby committed to
(3) The only situation that could non-violently necessitate a person’s acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secure her salvation, is having a vision of God (and the Truth) that is equal to the beatific vision in clarity, if not in duration.
For it is conceivable that a person could be gifted with a certain “intervention”—say, an abundant outpouring of grace, coupled perhaps with an abundantly clear vision of her soteriological situation—without (yet) having the sort of vision described in (3), where this “intervention” non-violently necessitates the person’s acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secures her salvation. Nor does (2) commit one to
(4) The only situation that could possibly secure a person’s salvation non-violently and infallibly, is one that non-violently necessitates immediate and total adherence to God.
For it is conceivable that the situation that secures the person’s salvation infallibly is one that puts him immediately (and necessarily) onto a path of conversion and/or purification which will inevitably lead to total adherence to God.
In the previous post I defined “infernalism” as the view that (i) all created spirits exist forever (no person is annihilated), (ii) hell exists, (iii) some human persons/souls go to hell after their time on earth has ended, and (iv) whoever goes to hell (after their particular judgement) remains there forever in conscious torment. Can an infernalist consistently accept theses (1) and (2) above? He certainly can. For (2) is consistent with
(5) While God can put each created person into a salvation-securing situation, He need not, and in fact, He chooses not to.
A “salvation-securing situation” is a situation that non-violently necessitates the person’s acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secures their salvation. My argument turns on this point. If memory serves me, (5) represents the position taken in Fr William Most's book, Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God (2004).
Note that (5) is consistent with (6), the claim that God puts some people into a salvation-securing situation:
(6) There is a (non-empty) set of created persons such that for each member M of this set, God puts M into a salvation-securing situation.
Point (5) is even consistent with (7), the claim that God has decreed to put some people into a salvation-securing situation regardless of any individual merit of theirs:
(7) There is a (non-empty) set of created persons such that for each member M of this set (i) God puts M into a salvation-securing situation and (ii) God’s (eternal) decision to do so is not responsive to any previous merit of M.
“Previous merit” is merit attained by the person when he acted with free-will temporally prior to the salvation-securing situation. Previous merit is foreseen by God—it is temporally “previous” with respect to the salvation-securing situation, but not in respect to God’s knowledge.
It is conceivable that some of those who happen to fall into the category described in (6) do not fall into the category described in (7). Suppose someone is so faithful to God in her free-will responses to grace across her life that God deems it fitting to put her (eventually) into a salvation-securing situation. Suppose also that God wouldn’t have put that person into a salvation-securing question if she hadn’t been so faithful. In that case, God decision to put the person into a salvation-securing situation is responsive to a previous merit of that person.
I subscribe to infernalism. I also subscribe to (1), (2), (5) and (7). In my view, our hearts our restless until they rest in God (point 1), and while God is able to put each created person into a salvation-securing situation (point 2), He chooses to do this for some people only (point 5). In some or all of these cases God’s decision to do so is not responsive to any previous merit in the person concerned (point 7). Point (7) is not essential to my main argument, however.
This much should be abundantly clear by now: simply pointing out the truth of the first two theses above is no argument in favour of universalism. In order to refute infernalism, the universalist has to refute (5) by introducing a further premise or set of premisses.
