Tuesday, February 16, 2021

The Source of the Disagreement Between Universalists and Infernalists: A Pared Down Follow-Up

This is a shorter (< 1000 words) and simpler version of the main argument contained in my previous post. I approach things from a slightly different angle here, however, and the wording is different.


The animals going in were male and female of every living thing, as God had commanded Noah. Then the LORD shut him in. 
Gen 7:16 (NIV, my emphasis).

Painting by Jan van 't Hoff.

 

      I begin with two theses:

(1) Our hearts are restless until they rest in God
 

      [A truth made famous by Augustine in his Confessions. Cf. Points (8) and (9) in the previous post].

(2) God is able to put each created person into a situation that would non-violently necessitate her acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secure her salvation.

To say that God “is able” to put each created person into the situation described above is to say that for a created person to be in that situation and be necessitated non-violently to accept the love of God, does not involve any inherent contradiction. One can be “non-violently” necessitated to accept the love of God in the sense that under certain conditions, one cannot help but turn to God in love. It is understood that this turning to God in love is voluntary—it is willed whole-heartedly, with sufficiently clear knowledge that there is genuine consent—and perfective—for loving communion with God is the deepest desire of each person, and its realisation represents one’s final perfection. “Voluntary” does not imply libertarian free-will—i.e., the simultaneous ability to will X and not-X under the same conditions.

The first thesis supports the second. The reason that God is able to non-violently necessitate our love for Him is that we are made for Him—our essential will is oriented to the Good, which is God.

It is traditional Catholic teaching that, while the saints in heaven love God voluntarily, they are not free (with libertarian free-will) to turn away from God. To enjoy the beatific vision is to be in a situation that non-violently necessitates one’s total adherence to God. However, someone who accepts (2) is not thereby committed to

(3) The only situation that could non-violently necessitate a person’s acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secure her salvation, is having a vision of God (and the Truth) that is equal to the beatific vision in clarity, if not in duration.

For it is conceivable that a person could be gifted with a certain “intervention”—say, an abundant outpouring of grace, coupled perhaps with an abundantly clear vision of her soteriological situation—without (yet) having the sort of vision described in (3), where this “intervention” non-violently necessitates the person’s acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secures her salvation. Nor does (2) commit one to

(4) The only situation that could possibly secure a person’s salvation non-violently and infallibly, is one that non-violently necessitates immediate and total adherence to God.

For it is conceivable that the situation that secures the person’s salvation infallibly is one that puts him immediately (and necessarily) onto a path of conversion and/or purification which will inevitably lead to total adherence to God.

In the previous post I defined “infernalism” as the view that (i) all created spirits exist forever (no person is annihilated), (ii) hell exists, (iii) some human persons/souls go to hell after their time on earth has ended, and (iv) whoever goes to hell (after their particular judgement) remains there forever in conscious torment. Can an infernalist consistently accept theses (1) and (2) above? He certainly can. For (2) is consistent with

(5) While God can put each created person into a salvation-securing situation, He need not, and in fact, He chooses not to.

A “salvation-securing situation” is a situation that non-violently necessitates the person’s acceptance of the love of God and infallibly secures their salvation. My argument turns on this point. If memory serves me, (5) represents the  position taken in Fr William Most's book, Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God (2004).

Note that (5) is consistent with (6), the claim that God puts some people into a salvation-securing situation:

(6) There is a (non-empty) set of created persons such that for each member M of this set, God puts M into a salvation-securing situation.

Point (5) is even consistent with (7), the claim that God has decreed to put some people into a salvation-securing situation regardless of any individual merit of theirs:

(7) There is a (non-empty) set of created persons such that for each member M of this set (i) God puts M into a salvation-securing situation and (ii) God’s (eternal) decision to do so is not responsive to any previous merit of M.

“Previous merit” is merit attained by the person when he acted with free-will temporally prior to the salvation-securing situation. Previous merit is foreseen by God—it is temporally “previous” with respect to the salvation-securing situation, but not in respect to God’s knowledge.

It is conceivable that some of those who happen to fall into the category described in (6) do not fall into the category described in (7). Suppose someone is so faithful to God in her free-will responses to grace across her life that God deems it fitting to put her (eventually) into a salvation-securing situation. Suppose also that God wouldn’t have put that person into a salvation-securing question if she hadn’t been so faithful. In that case, God decision to put the person into a salvation-securing situation is responsive to a previous merit of that person.

I subscribe to infernalism. I also subscribe to (1), (2), (5) and (7). In my view, our hearts our restless until they rest in God (point 1), and while God is able to put each created person into a salvation-securing situation (point 2), He chooses to do this for some people only (point 5). In some or all of these cases God’s decision to do so is not responsive to any previous merit in the person concerned (point 7). Point (7) is not essential to my main argument, however.

This much should be abundantly clear by now: simply pointing out the truth of the first two theses above is no argument in favour of universalism. In order to refute infernalism, the universalist has to refute (5) by introducing a further premise or set of premisses.

11 comments:

  1. Thank you for this update. The smaller number of premises makes it easier to follow. I would like to give some thought to #5 and return with an additional comment.
    Blessings on you and your ministry.

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  2. Dr Triffett, here is my response to your article: https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2021/02/17/supplying-the-missing-universalist-premise/

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    1. Thank you for that, Father Kimel. I had no doubt that this would be the "missing" premise. I'll say more later. God bless.

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    2. Father Kimel, here is my response to your response.

      https://brendantriffett1.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-premise-i-didnt-overlook.html

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  3. The best way to reflect on Premise #5 is to consider what God is like based on #5. Jesus often describes a person's relationship to God in terms of father and son. (St. Paul picks that up again with the term Abba.)

    So what kind of father is God if, as #5 says, He "chooses not to" rescue His own children? If I did not rescue my own son from a life-threatening situation, what would that evidence about my own character? My son died, although I could have saved him, simply because I chose not to. The God of Premise #5 is abhorrent and cannot be worshipped.

    If Our Lord has graced you with children of your own, you will know exactly what I mean. Failure to act when your child is in peril is inconceivable.

    May God richly bless you and grant us both wisdom as we reflect on such important issues.

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    1. Hi again. Perhaps you're mistaking me for a TULIP Calvinist. The Father that I believe in does not "fail to act" when His children are in peril--He sends His Son and Spirit, provides the Church, sends all sorts of means of grace and opportunities to every person (nobody is reprobate in Calvinist's sense).

      If in the act of "rescuing" you include the human response (co-operating with grace) which is necessary for salvation, then no, God does not "rescue" all--but that is not because God neglected anybody. But if by "rescue" you mean provide abundant means and genuine opportunities to be saved, then yes, God "rescues" everyone.

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    2. Dr. Triffet, I was not thinking about the TULIP. I was trying to closely track the wording of #5. The precise wording of #5, that God can rescue, but chooses not to, makes God into a moral monster. I'm sure you don't intend that, but how can the conclusion be avoided? I, as a human father, with all my weaknesses, cannot imagine the ability to save my child, followed by a decision not to do so. Am I a better father than God?

      It seems that the wording of #5 desparately needs to be reworked. I'm not sure the wording can be fixed, but the way it is now leads to a conclusion that I am sure you did not intend.

      At some point, I would like to talk about the great joy that comes from recognizing Universal Redemption, but perhaps a time for that will come later. Blessings on you.

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    3. Thanks again, Jay. Some questions: (1) Do you think that the only way that God can possibly "rescue" Joe Blogs, and act as a merciful divine saviour for Joe, is to infallibly predestine Joe for salvation? (2) Is there such a thing as an offer of grace which is genuinely sufficient for salvation, yet resistible? (3) If Joe were to accept such an offer and make use of this grace, thereby making it to heaven, would that count as "rescue" and "salvation"? If not, why not?

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  4. (5) Isn't an argument, it's an assertion. You can't "refute" an assertion not supported by anything other than, apparently "because I say so". The argument over whether infernalism or universalism is true is the argument over whether (5) is true. Your "thesis" (5) is simply re-stating in other words and without any supporting argument the infernalist case.

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    1. "The argument over whether infernalism or universalism is true is the argument over whether (5) is true." Precisely, Iain. See here
      https://brendantriffett1.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-premise-i-didnt-overlook.html

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