Showing posts with label Freedom. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Freedom. Show all posts

Thursday, September 9, 2021

Eternity as Uninterrupted Flow: A Reflection on Heaven, Ecstasy and the Difficult Work of Being-in-Time

  

Abstract

In Western philosophy and theology it is traditional to think of movement as an imperfection, as a sign that something lacks being (ousia). There is movement in time and only in time. In eternity, which is timeless duration, there is no movement. In the following this formula is inverted and an alternative sense of “movement” explored. Time impedes movement; eternity is unimpeded flow. In time it is possible to step back, to hold oneself in reserve, to change one’s mind, to have a charge of heart. To renew one’s devotion to God. To initiate once more one’s love for God. To build a character. To add merit upon merit. But when our time is over and we enter into eternity, our real movement begins. From this point on there is an unending movement in which what we are manifests itself continually and necessarily. If by “movement” we mean change or process then there is no movement in eternity. But “movement” can also mean flow. In time alone it is possible for things to have stasis—for things to hold themselves back, for the natural flow of things to be impeded. Stasis is an imperfection, a lack of ek-stasis. Eternity is uninterrupted movement/flow.

 

Eternity as Uninterrupted Flow

In the next life our fundamental orientation cannot be altered. The trajectory of our will remains fixed; we are unable to veer further up or down, further to the left or to the right. The condition in which we find ourselves after death determines the direction we go. We soar or sink toward our heart’s treasure. Such, at least, is the majority Christian view.[1]

For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also. (Mt 6:21, NIV)

In the next life there is no such thing as “movement”, if by that we mean a change of heart—either conversion to the light or a falling away. Nonetheless, in heaven there is a continual unfolding of who we are in relation to God and others. (Is there some sort of dynamic “unfolding” of things in hell? I don’t know. I’m not interested in that here). The unfolding of things in heaven is never exhausted. Manifestation follows upon manifestation for all eternity, in an ending act of parousia (the full presence of God and His Truth).

In heaven there is uninhibited dynamism and activity. How could it be otherwise, given that, in the words of Hans Urs von Balthasar, the triune God is eternal Ereignis, unending Event of Love? In heaven we orbit around God. Or rather, we spiral ever-inward into the infinitesimal centre of God. We plummet forever into God the absolute vortex, God the thrice-holy “white hole” at the centre of everything. As flames of love we fall into God helplessly, and our helplessness is beatitude, ecstasy, unspeakable joy.

But in time our movement into the Good (or into sin) is discontinuous. It is broken up into discrete, accumulated moments of decision. Time thrusts us forward, again and again, into the next test, the next situation. What will I choose? Will I accept this grace or reject it? Will I continue in this fashion or change course? Will I succumb to this temptation or will I resist? Will I take the path of least resistance, following my weaker nature? Or will I obey the promptings of grace? Only on rare occasions in this life does a person completely “lose herself” in ecstasy—and when she does, it is only for a while. The ecstatic “loss of oneself” is never perfect in this life, as it is for those in the full presence of God.

We do not want to be annihilated. But we do want to lose ourselves in love. Our fundamental desire to “let ourselves go” in response to the ultimate Good defines us as persons made in the image of God. The state of holding ourselves in reserve, in distrust, in existential uncertainty, or in regimented self-control—that is not our destiny. The condition of having to choose to give oneself over, again and again each moment, in a renewed expression of our commitment to love, over-against whatever resistance remains in our nature—that is not our final destiny either.

Is this the predicament that lovers are attempting to overcome in their erotic love—the predicament of being-in-time? Is this the motivation for the various addictions and other attempts to achieve some form of ecstasy or state of complete rest? Our desire to be immersed in the flow of eternity, no longer journeying through time as a pilgrim? We tire from walking. Constantly overcoming gravity and friction can be gruelling work. We want to let go and stop fighting. We want to fall and glide. The alcoholic reaches for a bottle of wine. The porn addict falls into a moving image. And so on. We are looking for uninterrupted flow; we want to fall into a single object or experience and let everything go. We need consolation for the struggle of being-in-time. There is pain and tension in not being able (yet) to lose oneself.

This is why hope is necessary. Without the supernatural virtue of hope, could any of us delay the spiritual gratification of total release? Could any of us resist the temptation to lose ourselves prematurely and plummet into some inner-worldly object?

Perfect freedom is being so possessed by the divine Beloved that one no longer has free-will. To be sure, volition remains in the next life. Acts of the will shall continue in eternity. We repeat our loving “yes” to God and to everything He loves, over and over, forever. But this “yes” is not a free-will decision against a possible “no”. In heaven, “no” is no longer possible. The “yes” emerges from us necessarily; it is a wave surging through us unstoppably. It is indeed our yes—we put our personal stamp on the love that flows through us. We do the agreeing, the affirming, the loving, the consenting (though it is God who does all this in first place—we add our names in second place). But in heaven there is nothing left in us by which we could possibly resist the incessant waves of love surging through our being. In that state of perfection (perfect holiness), what could possibly impede the flow of love into us and through us? What could halt the flow of our praise?

In heaven we can no longer “stand back” and choose between various options. We cannot hold some calculating mind or self-determining liberty in reserve. The time for decision-making between good and evil—or between stronger and weaker correspondence to grace—is over. Everything we do and say in heaven is ours (this “doing” is not work, for there is nothing left to overcome within or without ourselves). To be sure, all of our doing and saying in heaven is, in the first place, the doing and the saying of God—God acting in us, God passing through us and back to Himself. God loving Himself, God uttering Himself in and through His beloved creatures. Even so, everything that happens to us and in us and through us—all of this is willed by us. It happens freely. We allow it to happen. But our allowing happens necessarily—we cannot do otherwise. And this is our joy, this is our true freedom—that we cannot do otherwise than love, for all eternity.

This is consummate union with the Beloved: having neither the slightest impurity nor the slightest capacity to hesitate or swerve in our love for Him. Finally, a person now is a lover of God—she has been given ousia, confirmed in unchanging being. Whereas in time, the person had to choose again and again to love God, merely imitating the eternal form, the ousia of the lover. In time, the eternal flow of love—the unending, continuous, ecstatic and necessary movement of love—is merely hinted at in and between the moments. We touch upon that flow and begin to be drawn into its movement whenever we behold someone beautiful or participate in something glorious; our soul then sprouts wings (as in Plato’s Phaedrus); we recall the ecstatic flow for which each of us is destined. Perfect flow is the absence of hesitation, the absence of self-reserve, the ecstatic inability to hold anything of oneself back. It is the total involvement of oneself—the ecstatic breaking-forth releasing every last drop of the mystery of our being—in the unending Now of Love. A perfectly fluid yielding of oneself, a maximal fluidity that is impossible as long as we are in time. In time we choose and shape our final condition in step-wise fashion; in eternity our final condition unfolds and we plummet helplessly into our heart’s treasure.

Moments in time are divided from each other, thus breaking up the flow of eternity. Eternity still manages to break into time; even now we can begin to participate in its flow. By grace—and what grace!—we are allowed to “practice” that flow for ourselves, as apprentice saints. Yet free-choice remains, and the glory of eternity is shrouded (these two facts are connected). We enter into the flow but we can also drop out of that flow again in some way. The flow of the Holy descends into our midst—but then withdraws. Mundane realities and practical necessities impose themselves again. Perhaps the grace was only given to us for a certain time. Or perhaps we begin to reflect too much on ourselves, or on peripheral things—or worse, we begin the descent into sin. In any case, to be wholly and continually immersed in—and completely unable to withdraw from—the perfect flow of eternity is our final destination. It is not our experience of being-in-time.

There is a sense, then, in which time interrupts movement. In time it is possible to step back, to hold oneself in reserve, to change one’s mind, to have a charge of heart. To renew, time and again, one’s devotion to God. To initiate once more (in response to God’s prevenient grace) one’s love for God. To build a character. To add merit upon merit—or to heap coals upon our heads.

Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moths and vermin destroy, and where thieves break in and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where moths and vermin do not destroy, and where thieves do not break in and steal. (Mt 6:19-20, NIV).

But when our time is over, and we enter into eternity, our real movement begins. It is an unending movement in which what we are (in relation to God and others) manifests itself continually and necessarily.

The continual unfolding of oneself before God and with others cannot be stopped. All the same, it is the person who wills it. A person wills this manifestation necessarily, forever, on the basis of who and what he is. This manifestation of oneself does not take any glory away from God. For the creature who speaks and acts on the basis of holiness—the dignity of every citizen of heaven—glorifies God in everything.

If by “movement” we mean change or process (including the process of maturing) then there is no movement in eternity. But “movement” can also mean flow. And this precisely is what eternity is: uninterrupted flow.

 

 



[1] For a Catholic articulation see the Catechism of the Catholic Church §§393, 1023-1029, 1033-1037. For the view of Thomas Aquinas, refer to Summa Contra Gentiles Book 4, §95 or this useful commentary by Edward Feser.

 

Monday, March 1, 2021

Freedom vs Freedom: One Example of Equivocation in "That All Shall be Saved"

 

While reading David Bentley Hart’s That All Shall be Saved, one thing that stood out for me (apart from the book's many positive qualities) is Hart's tendency to equivocate. Without warning or comment he will slide between different meanings of the same term in the same argumentative sequence. Here's one particularly telling example, from pp. 178-79.

 

For those who worry that this all amounts to a kind of metaphysical determinism of the will, I may not be able to provide perfect comfort. Of course it is a kind of determinism, but only at the transcendental level, and only because rational volition must be determinate to be anything at all. Rational will is by nature the capacity for intentional action, and so must exist as a clear relation between (in Aristotelian terms) the “origin of motion” within it and the “end” that prompts that motion—between, that is, its efficient and final causes. Freedom is a relation to reality, which means liberty from delusion. This divine determinism toward the transcendent Good, then, is precisely what freedom is for a rational nature.

 

Here Hart defines freedom as a certain “relation to reality” which implies “liberty from delusion.” He also defines it as the “divine determinism” of the rational will or the person “toward the transcendent Good.”

 

This is rather confusing. Let’s begin with the second definition (freedom as the “divine determinism” of the rational will toward the Good). Hart appears to be saying that freedom is the intrinsic orientation of a person (or the rational will, or a rational nature) toward God, the transcendent Good. Following that definition, a person has freedom even when he is caught up in sin and delusion. For surely, Hart does not want to say that sin and delusion remove a person’s basic orientation toward the Good (for his argument here rests on the claim that a person can never extinguish his basic orientation toward the Good). Nor does Hart deny that sin and delusion are possible for a human person in this life. He explicitly affirms that possibility later on (p. 179):

 

That is not to deny that, within the embrace of this relation between the will's origin and its end in the Good (what, again, Maximus the Confessor calls our "natural will"), there is considerable room for deliberative liberty with regard to differing finite options (what Maximus calls the "gnomic will") and considerable room in which to stray from the ideal path.

 

But if a sufficient condition for having “freedom” is being a rational nature that is intrinsically oriented toward the Good, and if this sufficient condition is fulfilled—and the person still “free”—even when he is caught up in sin and delusion, then freedom does not mean liberty from delusion. And yet Hart says, in the first defining sentence, that “freedom is a relation to reality, which means liberty from delusion."

 

Perhaps we need to go back and re-interpret Hart when he says that “divine determinism toward the transcendent Good … is precisely what freedom is for a rational nature.” I assumed above that, for Hart, the “divine determinism toward the transcendent Good” is just the person’s intrinsic orientation toward the Good (and that the orientation is “divine” in the sense that it is caused by and directed to God). But as we just saw, this assumption doesn’t fit with Hart’s other claim that “freedom means liberty from delusion.” So let’s make a different assumption. Perhaps what Hart means is that a person is free—and conditioned by a certain “divine determinism toward the transcendent Good”—inasmuch as he is liberated from sin and delusion. If that is the case, then what Hart means by freedom in this passage is perfect liberty from sin—the inability to sin (non posse peccare) (See Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, ch. 28, §105). On this definition of freedom, a person is “free” insofar as he is able to love God and unable to reject God.

 

For the sake of clarity--which is always necessary in a theological or philosophical debate--I will refer to freedom in this sense (non posse peccare) as “true freedom*” (the reader should not automatically assume that when Hart writes “true freedom” he means “true freedom* as defined here).

 

“Freedom” appears in two consecutive sentences in the quoted passage. “Freedom is a relation to reality, which means liberty from delusion. This divine determinism toward the transcendent Good, then, is precisely what freedom is for a rational nature.” One would assume that Hart doesn’t mean freedom in two different senses here. To slip from one definition or understanding to another, in such a short space, with no warning, while making an argument about freedom, would indicate a momentary lapse of reason, if not philosophical incompetence. It would be uncharitable to assume that Hart’s logic is flawed in that way. So let's assume that Hart doesn’t flit from one meaning of “freedom” to another from one sentence to the next. What then does he mean by “freedom”? He means “true freedom*” (non posse peccare). What else could he mean, given his claim that “freedom is a relation to reality, which means liberty from delusion”?

 

From here we should go back and reinterpret Hart’s claim that “This divine determinism toward the transcendent Good … is precisely what freedom is for a rational nature” (my emphasis). By “divine determinism toward the transcendent Good”, Hart must mean something over and above the intrinsic orientation of a person toward God. For by “freedom” Hart means true freedom* (such at least is our working hypothesis). And presumably, Hart doesn’t want to say that, by simply being oriented toward the Good as a rational nature, a person has true freedom* and is therefore unable to sin!

 

Unfortunately, this cannot be right. For Hart says later on (on the same page--p. 179):

 

yes, there is an original and ultimate divine determinism of the creature’s intellect and will, and for just this reason there is such a thing as true freedom in the created realm.

 

There is no indication in that statement, or in the paragraphs immediately preceding it (these concern the “natural end” of the will), that Hart is distinguishing between the intrinsic orientation of the person toward God on one hand, and the “divine determinism” of the person (or his/her intellect and will) on the other. And why would Hart qualify said “divine determinism” as original if he understood it to be some further condition of grace or liberation that might be added to the person over and above her intrinsic orientation toward God?

 

As it turns out, then, Hart does flit from one understanding (definition/sense) of “freedom” to another in the space of just two sentences! “Freedom is a relation to reality, which means liberty from delusion. This divine determinism toward the transcendent Good, then, is precisely what freedom is for a rational nature.” In the first sentence, “freedom” is true freedom*: the spiritual condition of being so liberated from disorder and illusion that one necessarily (yet voluntarily) loves God above all things (non posse peccare). In the second sentence, being intrinsically oriented toward God as created spirit is a sufficient condition for having “freedom”—indeed it is “precisely what freedom is for a rational nature”—and this freedom is not true freedom*, for it is compatible with sin and delusion.

 

If there is another way of interpreting the quoted passage that does not involve Hart in either self-contradiction or equivocation in respect to the meaning of “freedom”, perhaps Hart or one of his defenders should come forward with it. I think it's more likely that Hart didn't think through the meaning and implications of his two "definitions" of freedom in this particular sequence, and so wrote something that he didn't really mean.

 

What makes this unsettling is the fact that the equivocation occurs across two sentences in a row, where a particular term is being explicitly defined! To make things worse, in the second case Hart says he is being "precise": "This divine determinism ... is precisely what freedom is for a rational nature [my emphasis]."

 

To be fair, there are other passages concerning freedom in the book; Hart isn't always this unclear in his use of terms. (See, e.g., pp. 36-38).

Eternity as Uninterrupted Flow: A Reflection on Heaven, Ecstasy and the Difficult Work of Being-in-Time

    Abstract In Western philosophy and theology it is traditional to think of movement as an imperfection, as a sign that something lack...